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## ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN KAZAKHSTAN: STATE POLICY

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### ABSTRACT

*It is widely known that Islamic revival is behind numerous national security threats, religious tension and political challenges. This is confirmed by the fact that practically all terrorist acts are committed by extremist and terrorist groups, which reproduce and execute specific projects of Islamic revival, the Islamic Caliphate being one of the pertinent examples. Fully aware of the threats rooted in the radical and extremist ideas of Islamic revival, the state has no choice but an active and determined opposition. In the 2005-2020, Kazakhstan adopted several normative legal program documents and took certain organizational measures to improve the regulation of the religious situation in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Many of these laws and organizational measures, however, stirred up heated discussions: the opposition insisted that the state should secularize the society, securitize Islam, etc. Much has been said about the efficiency of opposition to radical and extremist models of Islamic revival. Together, this creates a varied and even contradictory background for the state policy related to Islamic revival and calls for closer attention to the situation unfolding among the Muslims of Kazakhstan.*

*We are already in the third decade of the 21st century, an important stage at which the religious and political environment created by Islamic revival and the relations between the state and confessions should be assessed. In this article, we analyze the state policy in the context of Islamic revival and offer its conceptual analysis as a multifaceted phenomenon. A modernist trend, which often prevails, is developing along with the fundamentalist trend within the framework of the Islamic revival. Accordingly, the authors argue that state policy is not directed against the Islamic revival as such and does not aim for the securitization of Islam or the secularization of society; on the contrary, it seeks to preserve the historically formed recontextualized Islam, which is rooted in the fundamentals of Islam and is simultaneously consistent with modernization and national heritage.*

*In the concluding part of the article the authors touch upon a scholarly discussion of whether state policy of opposing the extremist Islamic revival models is efficient and to which extent. Our discussion and conclusions are supported by sociological data on the religious situation in the Muslim community, obtained through comparison of the religiosity level and the extent of people's respect for the country's authorities.*

**Keywords:** contextualization of Islam, religious situation, Islam in Kazakhstan, politicization of Islam, securitization of Islam.



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## Introduction

Disintegration of the Soviet Union that ended the Cold War shifted the world to a new paradigm of political relations, where religious identity acquired political dimensions and was exacerbated by globalization. The Internet and the global economic systems diversified and widened the channels for religious value propagation. In the political space, the states acquired new neighbors and transnational organizations that actively promote state or quasi-state interests through virtual or real social networks. The concept of security has become multidimensional and, therefore, much more complicated.<sup>1</sup> Samuel Huntington, in turn, was convinced that “in the modern world, religion is a central, perhaps *the* central force that motivates and mobilizes people.”<sup>2</sup> Bryan Turner has written that religion is gradually moving to the fore in the process of formulating political ideologies and political identities.<sup>3</sup> In the same way, religion has climbed high on the political agenda.

While the state has its own governance experience, religion also has its own historical experience that warrants social management. Many organizations have predictably relied on religion in pursuit of political aims, as widely used in the Muslim countries. As a consolidating ideology, Islam contributed to the rise of certain political figures or organizations to power, Iran being one of the best examples. It inspired the Islamic world and promoted the idea of *Islamic revival*. Different organizations, i.e., the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qa’eda, Hizb ut-Tahrir, etc., promoted their radical or modernist ideas as the best models of Islamic revival. This stirred up competition or even fierce opposition between those who supported the contextualization and purification of Islam. Prof. Abdulkader Tayob has the following to say on the issue: “The return to a point of origin, a new beginning, promises unity of purpose and vision, but has in practice led to greater complexity, disunity and conflict... The return to origins in revival movements has taken on many different forms in the last two to three hundred years. Focusing only on the major trends and tendencies, the turn to the origins of Islam created anti-Sufi movements, new Sufi Movements, modernisms, religious ideologies and individualized religious paths. The search for revival, it seems, has no end-point and will probably generate more variety and complexity in the future.”<sup>4</sup>

On the whole, the ideas of Islamic revival driven by migration, globalization and digitalization reached different sociocultural spaces, where Muslims remained divided into two main groups. Turner has pointed out that the struggle between those who support “pure global Islam” and “local traditional Islam” became an everyday phenomenon. This is what is going on in Kazakhstan,<sup>5</sup> which has acquired all sorts of radical and modernist organizations that are actively promoting their Islamic revival models. In 2011, the state was confronted by several extremist and terrorist religious organizations of the Soldiers of the Caliphate type, who tried to realize their ideas through terrorist acts in Kazakhstan.<sup>6</sup>

This means that Islamic revival requires a careful study of the Kazakhstani sociocultural and political space. Here we attempt to identify the current state of Islamic revival and interpret the response of the state.

## Conceptual Analysis of Islamic Revival

Islamic scholars interpret Islamic revival as a phenomenon in its own right which, contrary to the earlier predictions, is spreading through the Muslim world.<sup>7</sup> Reza Aslan, Tariq Ramadan, Ziauddin Sardar, Hamza Yusuf and hundreds of their colleagues all over the world have made Islamic revival the center of their scholarly studies. Prof. Tayob, for example, states that revival presupposes the dialectics of three different approaches: return to origins, deconstructivism and contextualism which, however, do not exhaust its meanings. Revival points rather to crisis, to resolution and repeated crisis.<sup>8</sup> Syed Farid Alatas has proposed a very interesting idea: he interprets the trends around the unfolding Muslim revival as a call to Protestant-type reformation in the Muslim world.<sup>9</sup> Muslim scholars are generally convinced that Islamic revival improves the Muslim countries through reforms. Osman Bakar believes that reforms are inevitable: they will open new horizons for the religious community.<sup>10</sup> Those who share this opinion do not demand any changes in the sources or the basic religious principles.<sup>11</sup> Balandas Ghoshal, however, recommends a careful approach; he is convinced that Arabization does not lead to the needed revival.<sup>12</sup>

Islamic revival as a subject of scholarly studies is not limited to the Muslim world; it is the subject of an active academic discussion all over the world. In the post-Cold War period and, to an even greater extent, after the Bosnian War, this phenomenon attracted a lot of interest in the West. Numerous related subjects were discussed in connection with revived religiosity in the secular society; its interaction with secular culture and inter-religious dialogs and conflicts. In the West this concept is largely explained through the clash of civilizations (S. Huntington),<sup>13</sup> desecularization (P. Berger),<sup>14</sup> multi-cultural dialog (J. Habermas)<sup>15</sup> and post-secular society (B. Turner).<sup>16</sup>

Bryan Turner associates the phenomenon of Islamic revival with an attempt to reconfirm Islamic identity in a society under the pressure of urban secularism.<sup>17</sup>

Samuel Huntington provided a systemic description of Islamic revival: an attempt of the Muslim community to find its own path to modernization, but not to Westernization. “It is a broad intellectual, cultural, social, and political movement prevalent throughout the Islamic world.”<sup>18</sup> Islamic fundamentalism, understood as political Islam, is a part of a multisided process of the Islamic idea resurgence. “The Resurgence is mainstream not extremist, pervasive not isolated.”<sup>19</sup>



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Generally, Huntington did not separate Islamic revival and modernism, yet opposed it to Westernization, which makes modernist Islam and radical Islam two Islamic revival projects.

Ermin Sinanović, likewise, points at the plurality of projects within Islamic revival as a phenomenon intertwined with modernism, on the one hand, and a development program, on the other. Very much like democracy, it is not a one-sided anti-modernist radical phenomenon attached to a certain tradition; both have many variants.<sup>20</sup>

The doctrines of Islamic revival reflect differing ideas about the ways and prospects of Islam in the modern world. Today, there are two main types of Islamic revival: “modernist Islam,” on the one hand, and “radical Islam,” on the other.<sup>21</sup> All other models are variants of these two types in the same way that different models of conceptualized Islam are but varieties of Islamic revival.

## Islamic Revival in the Post-Soviet Political and Sociocultural Processes in Kazakhstan

According to Erkin Baydarov, Elena Burova, and Anatoli Kosichenko, the history of state-confessional relations consists of three main periods: 1992-2005, 2005-2011 and 2011 to present time. The first period can be described as liberal; the second, the beginning of state regulation of the sphere of religion, while the third began in 2011 when the Law on Religious Activity and Religious Associations was adopted.<sup>22</sup> An analysis of the history of political and sociocultural life in Kazakhstan revealed that these stages affected the process of Islamic revival in Kazakhstan. The first was associated with Islamic recontextualization; the second, with institutionalization of different models of Islamic revival; the third, with an active state policy designed to preserve recontextualized Islam and oppose all radical and extremist models of Islamic revival in Kazakhstan.

### Islamic Revival and Recontextualization of Islam

According to Alma Sultangalieva,<sup>23</sup> Raushan Mustafina,<sup>24</sup> Shirin Akiner,<sup>25</sup> and Saule Isabaeva,<sup>26</sup> in the early 1990s, Islamic revival and the revival of ethnic culture and national identity were closely connected. State sovereignty promoted self-identification; post-colonialism revived national values in people’s minds. These authors have pointed out that at that time Islam was perceived by the autochthonous population as a part of their cultural heritage, a symbol of cultural revival and an element of an emerging national identity. Saodat Olimova has pointed out that this Islamic revival trend in the ethnically and culturally isolated nation became possible because “Islam existed as a way of life and as an identification of the indigenous population of Central Asia” during the Soviet period. In other words, she insists that this was a school “characterized by being moderate and deliberately separated from political power.”<sup>27</sup> It was this Islam that re-emerged in the region in the post-Soviet period. Sultan Akimbekov has arrived at a similar conclusion: Islamic revival is a product of civilizational coexistence between Islam and the Soviet ideology.<sup>28</sup> Zaur Djalilov, in turn, has summed up Islamic revival in the early period of Independence: “As distinct from traditional Islamic societies in which Islamic revival described restoration of values of the earliest Muslim community, in Kazakhstan everything was done to revive the values of ‘people’s Islam’ connected with national traditions and customs.”<sup>29</sup> The concept of “people’s Islam” invariably attracts attention as highly logical. It points to the presence of Islam in everyday life; on the other hand, it pushes aside the change of political principles of the time, which made Islam part of the democratic system and prompted the adoption of the Law of 1992 On the Freedom of Religion and Religious Associations. Islam re-orientated its loyalty from atheism to the secular principle, which explained its active recontextualization of the early 1990s: religion was reviving not only along with local traditions, but also with secular policy and democratic modernist values.

According to many experts, the demand for Islam was revived on both ethno-cultural and social foundations. Elena Burova,<sup>30</sup> Kadyrjan Smagulov,<sup>31</sup> and Anastasia Reshetnyak<sup>32</sup> treated Islamic revival as a result of social vulnerability and the lost trust in the state.

### Institutionalization of the Islamic Revival Models

The spiritual, moral, social, ethnic and traditional connotations of Islam contributed to its organization and institutionalization<sup>33</sup> (see Table 1).

**Table 1**

**The Number of Islamic Religious Associations in Kazakhstan between 1989-2020**





During the years of Independence, the country acquired 2,610 new mosques; a 39-fold increase from the 1991 figure of 68 mosques to the 2020 (3rd quarter) figure of 2,678 mosques (see Table 2).<sup>34</sup>

**Table 2**

**The Number of Mosques in Kazakhstan, 1989-2020**



Organizational institutionalization of Islam followed two trends: on the one hand, the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Kazakhstan (DUMK) consolidated traditional Islam based on the Hanafi maddhab; on the other, the number of non-traditional Islamic organizations established with foreign influence was steadily growing. In the latter half of the 1990s we became aware of active foreign influence, which has not disappeared. Dina Vilkovsky has pointed out that practically all big mosques and spiritual organizations appeared thanks to huge financial support of Muslim countries.<sup>35</sup> Pilgrimage and education in Muslim countries were, likewise, generously encouraged. Some of the recipients became representatives of all sorts of Muslim religious movements and began actively promoting their ideas. According to Elena Burova, newcomers were mainly interested in social support.<sup>36</sup> Nao Taker, an expert from Central Asia, has offered a very interesting opinion: people grew more religious when entangled in economic problems or exposed to foreign influence.<sup>37</sup> These two factors strongly affected the Central Asian societies, where Islamic revival became a pluralistic phenomenon.

Foreign influence brought a wide variety of Islamic movements of radical and modernist types to Kazakhstan: Hizb ut-Tahrir, Tablighi Jamaat, Jihad, Salafiyya, Ismatullah Mahsum, Suleymenshi, Hazrat Ibrahim, Nurcular, The Soldiers of the Caliphate, Traikatiyshlar, etc, which competed with the DUMK for the hearts and minds of local Muslims. This meant that Islam returned to its context of harmonic coexistence with tradition and the secular state was confronted by different models of Islamic revival, which pushed aside traditions and the idea of a secular state.

Many experts have pointed out that Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 15 January, 1992, On the Freedom of Religion and Religious Associations as the main source of religious pluralism strongly affected Islamic revival represented by a fairly large number of Islamic associations and mosques. Elena Burova, Dina Vilkovsky, Oksana Shakhnovskaya, Zaur Djalilov and others pointed at the liberal nature of the old law. Konstantin Sokolovsky quoted Serikjan Ismailov as saying: “At the same time, in the early 2000s the liberal nature of the laws deprived the corresponding state structures of all means of legal control over destructive cults.”<sup>38</sup> Olga Shakhnovskaya offered her own weighty arguments related to the highly liberal law of 1992, which offered no legal instruments: in the 1990s and 2000s missionary activities were not regulated, at least efficiently regulated, in Kazakhstan.<sup>39</sup>

## State Policy of Opposition to the Radical and Extremist Models of Islamic Revival

Certain events related to Islamic revival in Kazakhstan stirred up a lot of concerns in the corridors of power in general, and the DUMK in particular. In fact, the plurality of the Islamic revival models threatened the country’s security; the war in Afghanistan added tension to the already problematic situation. Between 2005 and 2010, courts of different instances banned 17 terrorist and extremist organizations in the Republic of Kazakhstan.<sup>40</sup> Practically all of them promoted the ideas of Islamic revival.

The 2010s turned out to be a very special period: the state acquired sufficient determination to take legal and organizational measures against the radical and extremist models of Islamic revival. According to our analysis, the state realized its intention through several basic trends.

First, it consolidated the institutional foundations of recontextualized Islam; the DUMK was transformed into a centralized hierarchy that relied on the Hanafi maddhab. The state and the DUMK fortified their cooperation on many social and cultural issues; the state clarified the main point: recontextualized Islam was highly important for Kazakhstan, and any attempt at changing it is a serious threat to the spiritual ecosystem and, therefore, the harmony of the traditional, civic and humanitarian



values of Kazakhstan society.

Second, legal regulation of the religious sphere was readjusted to limit the possible propagation of extremist and radical Islamic revival models. The Law of 2011 On Religious Activities and Religious Associations, much stricter and much more extensive than its predecessor, was the main product of the new political trend. It limited, to a great extent, propaganda and distribution of religious literature. As distinct from the old law, the new one is much more specific in this respect.<sup>41</sup>

It is essential to point out that at the early stages of independence the religion-related laws kept the political nature of the Islamic revival within certain limits. The 1992 law, however, did not specify those limits. It was only in 1999 and 2005 that the issues related to terrorism and extremism were stipulated by corresponding laws. The old law left the political dimension of Islamic revival outside its capacities. The 2011 law was much more specific in preventing political activity of religious movements; it adjusted the process of Islamic revival and limited its political ambitions.

Third, the state promoted its secular principles by adopting the Concept of State Policy in the Religious Sphere for 2017-2020, which said the following: “The attempts to undermine the principles and pillars of a secular state, civic identity by ideologists of religious extremism are fraught with a mounting conflict potential, an increase of the number of followers of radical religious teachings, including those who plan to join the ranks of international terrorist organizations.”<sup>42</sup> This means that the secular principles of the state suppressed, to an extent, inter-confessional conflicts and created immunity to extremist and radical models of Islamic revival.

Fourth, the state was determined to oppose extremist and radical models of Islamic revival through the state program of opposition to religious extremism and terrorism in the Republic of Kazakhstan for the years 2013-2017. A similar program was elaborated for 2018-2022 in order to realize comprehensive and efficient measures of opposition to religious extremism and terrorism. This was also done to prevent the emergence of extremist and radical versions of Islamic revival.<sup>43</sup>

Fifth, consolidation of national identity through the Ruhani Zhangyru program based on the article of First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev “The Course Towards Future: Modernization of Public Consciousness” and realized on a grand scale in all educational establishments and state organizations of Kazakhstan. Put in a nutshell, it aimed for the revival of spiritual and national values of the peoples of Kazakhstan with due account for the risks and challenges of the day.<sup>44</sup>

On the whole, the state was determined to consolidate the foundations of recontextualized Islamic revival model by paying more attention to the spirituality of Hanafi maddhab, national identity, the secularity level and the struggle against radical movements. This policy has found its place in the speech of President Nazarbayev, in which he revealed Kazakhstan’s initiative to show the world that “Islam, progress and democracy are compatible.” As Zarema Shaukenova has pointed out: “In Kazakhstan a very special model of dialectical consciousness is realized: society tends to unity and increase rather than to division and deprivation.”<sup>45</sup> Recontextualized Islam is a product of the unique Kazakhstan model.

## Assessment of State Policies of Opposition to the Extremist and Radical Models of Islamic Revival

Experts cannot agree whether the measures taken by the state to oppose the radical and extremist models of Islamic revival should be assessed as positive or not. Ivan Tarasevich was dissatisfied with the new law; he insisted that it created a collision of sorts. On the one hand, the traditional religions found themselves in a less comfortable situation, on the other, the law does not protect the country’s population from extremist movements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami. The much stricter registration rules are absolutely useless: unlike the legal religious associations, extremist movements practically never register themselves and operate clandestinely. The new law, which intensified the secularization process, also increased the confrontation between the state and the radical Islamic movements. This trend may consolidate radical movements and their followers.<sup>46</sup>

Maria Omelicheva, who described the toughening of the registration rules as securitization of Islam, has arrived at identical conclusions. Repressive measures and the efforts to squeeze religions into the fairly restrictive frames will not have a positive effect on the religious situation in Kazakhstan. Division of Islam into traditional and non-traditional, moderate and radical might split society. Through its interference in the religious sphere, the state has become an opponent of radical, foreign Islam. The efforts to keep radicalization within certain limits might stir up indignation among the conservative supporters of Islam.<sup>47</sup>

Alma Sultangalieva points out that by interfering in the religious sphere the state undermines its own stability.<sup>48</sup> Kadyrjan Smagulov interpreted normative novelties as attempts to put Islam under state control. He states that radicalization of Islam begins at the lower levels and is caused primarily by social and economic vulnerability of the younger generation. Tougher measures that rely on the law and power structures when dealing with non-traditional religious associations may negatively affect the relations between the state and society: younger generations turn to all sorts of religious teachings in search of alternative ideologies.<sup>49</sup> This means that the measures realized by the state exacerbate, rather than suppress disagreements.



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Anastasia Reshetnyak is of a similar opinion, and points out that those who associate Islamization with radicalization are wrong. Islam is radicalized by the worsening social and economic prospects for the youth. So far, tougher legal norms have not improved the social and economic predicament of the younger generation. This makes the efficiency of these measures highly doubtful.<sup>50</sup>

On the other hand, the official religious policy is approved by many state organizations and their supporters from among regular people and public institutions. Konstantin Sokolovsky, for example, has quoted the following expert opinion: “The reform of the relations between the state and confessions carried out in 2011 can be described as an overdue measure taken to bring the multitude of non-traditional religious movements into the legal field and limit the destructive impacts of some of them.”<sup>51</sup> Associates of the Institute of Philosophy, Political Science and Religious Studies of the MON RK were among the active supporters of the new law and offered their arguments. They said, in particular, that Kazakhstan’s unique model of interconfessional harmony and people’s unity should be preserved; that national unity stems from the harmonious coexistence of Islam and Orthodoxy and that by consolidating the role of traditional religions the state consolidates national unity. This is quite logical: by the efforts to draw as many people as possible into their tenets, non-traditional religions undermine interconfessional harmony. According to sociological polls carried out among youth in 2009, about 56% of the polled have met members of non-traditional religions in the streets; 16.1% said that they came to their homes; 1.7% met them in cafes.<sup>52</sup> On the whole, these experts were convinced that the measures taken by the state ensured law and order in the religious sphere.

The Academy of Political Management at the Nur Otan Party has the following to say about the new law, its realization and the political measures in this context: “The measures adopted in a timely manner and realized by the state from 2011 to 2017 prevented 78 extremist terrorist acts. Since 2016, there have been no terrorist acts in Kazakhstan; from 2017 on, citizens of Kazakhstan have no longer been leaving the country for the Syrian-Iraqi zone. According to the public opinion poll, 80% of Kazakhstani citizens are firm in their rejection of destructive religious ideas.”<sup>53</sup>

The sociological studies carried across the republic in three quarters of 2020 on the initiative of the Committee of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan revealed that 89% of the respondents supported the state policy, 76.9% are aware of the measures taken to prevent extremism and terrorism; 83% of the respondents positively assessed the situation in the religious sphere. The respondents belonged to different confessions: 70.2% of them were Muslims; 26%, Orthodox Christians (see Table 3).<sup>54</sup> Out of the total number of the polled, 13% strictly followed all religious injunctions; 66% were believers who followed religious rules only during religious holidays and at religious ceremonies; 19% spoke of themselves as agnostics and unbelievers. A fairly big share (63.4%) supported the secular nature of the state; 40.6% of the polled positively spoke of religious clothing; 20.7% were indifferent; 28.3% were negative, while 10.9% remained undecided.<sup>55</sup>

**Table 3**

**Distribution of Population of Kazakhstan by Confessions, %**



The sociological data presented above confirms the positive nature of state policy in the religious sphere; the picture, however, is a mosaic of opinions of respondents from a variety of confessions. In Islam the situation is different. Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Uyghurs, Kurds and Tatars have become considerably more religious: in 2002, religious people constituted 64.7% of the total,<sup>56</sup> in 2011, 78.6%,<sup>57</sup> while it has risen to 87% by 2018.<sup>58</sup> In 2018, the share of Muslims among representatives of European ethnicities (Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians) was 1.6%. On the whole, religious pluralism corresponds to ethnicities (see Table 4).

**Table 4**

**The Share of Muslims by Ethnicity, %**



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The results of sociological studies of 2011 and 2018, which sought to find out to which extent Muslims respect power showed that those of them who prayed several times a day were more loyal to the authorities than those who never prayed. For instance, in 2018, 55% of praying Muslims highly respected the authorities, 27.6% respected it to an extent. The following shares were identified among the non-praying Muslims: 41.9% of them highly respected the authorities, while 40.5% respected them to an extent. The correlation between these two categories reveals the fact that the religiosity level is not a factor of positive/negative attitude to power. We should take into account the fact that in 2018 only 13.4% of the polled prayed several times a day, while 61.4% prayed on holidays, at religious ceremonies or never. This generally speaks of the fairly low impact level of radical Islamic movements on the Muslims' political ideas. The fairly high share of those who completely respected authorities in 2018 is much lower than it was in 2011 (see Table 5).<sup>59</sup> The results of a 2011 sociological survey revealed that 57.5% of the total number of Muslims fully respected power, while 4.9% respected it to an extent. The same can be said about members of other confessions.<sup>60</sup>

**Table 5**

**The Level of Respect for Power among Members of the Confessions of Kazakhstan, %**



The trend demonstrates that the number of dissatisfied Muslims was increasing for non-religious reasons. Sociological data testify that the state religious policy is efficient and its anti-extremist and anti-terrorist vectors are supported by the country's population.

## Conclusion

Having analyzed the situation in Kazakhstan, the authors concluded that the country is living in the process of Islamic revival and that we should not equate this process to the re-emergence of Islamic fundamentalism. This phenomenon is primarily related to the revival of modernist Islam. In Kazakhstan the share of recontextualized Islam is fairly large, which corresponds to the principles of modernism and secularity, as well as to the cultural and historical values of the citizens of Kazakhstan. In the religious sphere, the state sees preservation of this type of Islam as the task of prime importance.

<sup>1</sup> See: B. Buzan, "Security, the State, the 'New World Order, and Beyond'," in: *On Security*, Columbia University Press, New York, No. 7, 1998, pp. 187-211. [Back to text](#)

<sup>2</sup> S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Touchstone, New York, 1998, p. 66. [Back to text](#)

<sup>3</sup> See: B. Turner, "Islam, Religious Revival and the Sovereign State," *Muslim World*, Vol. 97, No. 3, 2007, pp. 405-418. [Back to text](#)

<sup>4</sup> A. Tayob, "Back to the Roots, the Origins and the Beginning: Reflections on Revival (*tajdid*) in Islamic Discourse," *Temenos*, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2014, pp. 257, 258. [Back to text](#)

<sup>5</sup> See: B. Turner, op. cit. [Back to text](#)

<sup>6</sup> See: E. Karin, *The Soldiers of the Caliphate: The Anatomy of a Terrorist Group*. Astana, 2016, p. 154. [Back to text](#)

<sup>7</sup> See: R.W. Hefner, "Modern Muslims and the Challenge of Plurality," *Society*, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2014, pp. 131-139 [Back to text](#)

<sup>8</sup> See: A. Tayob op. cit. [Back to text](#)

<sup>9</sup> See: S.F. Alatas, "Contemporary Muslim Revival: The case of 'Protestant Islam'," *Muslim World*, Vol. 97, 2007, pp. 508-520. [Back to text](#)

<sup>10</sup> See: O. Bakar, *Islamic Civilisation and the Modern World: Thematic Essays*, UBD Press, 2014. [Back to text](#)

<sup>11</sup> See: T. Ramadan, *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009. p. 372. [Back to text](#)

<sup>12</sup> See: B. Ghoshal, "Arabization: The Changing Face of Islam in Asia," *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 1, 2010, pp. 69-89. [Back to text](#)

<sup>13</sup> See: S. Huntington, op. cit. [Back to text](#)



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- <sup>14</sup> See: P.L. Berger, *The Desecularization of the World*, Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington, D.C., 1999, p. 143. [Back to text](#)
- <sup>15</sup> See: J. Habermas, *The Divided West Polity*, Cambridge, 2006. p. 248. [Back to text](#)
- <sup>16</sup> See: B. Turner, “Religion in a Post-Secular Society,” *State Religion Church*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2012, pp. 25-51. [Back to text](#)
- <sup>17</sup> See: Ibidem. [Back to text](#)
- <sup>18</sup> S. Huntington, op. cit., p. 110. [Back to text](#)
- <sup>19</sup> Ibidem. [Back to text](#)
- <sup>20</sup> See: E. Sinanović, “Islamic Revival as Development: Discourses on Islam, Modernity, and Democracy since the 1950s,” *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2012, pp. 3-24. [Back to text](#)
- <sup>21</sup> M.G. Fedotova, “Raznovidnosti islamskogo proekta v sistemnoy transformatsii obshchestva,” *Vestnik Permskogo universiteta. Filosofija, Psikhologija, Sotsiologija*, No. 1, 2017, pp. 123-130. [Back to text](#)
- <sup>22</sup> See: Z. Shaukenova et al., *Aktualnye voprosy gosudarstvenno-konfessionalnye otnosheniia v Respublike Kazakhstan*. Collection of materials, Institut filosofii i politologii KN MON RK, Almaty, 2012, p. 72. [Back to text](#)
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- <sup>24</sup> See: R. Mustafina, “Islam v Kazakhstane v sovremenny period,” *Qazaqstan Tarihy*, 6 September, 2013, available at [\[Link\]](#), 6 June, 2019. [Back to text](#)
- <sup>25</sup> See: Sh. Akiner, “Religion’s Gap: Islam and Central Asia in the 1990s,” *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2000, pp. 62-65. [Back to text](#)
- <sup>26</sup> See: S. Isabaeva, “Ugrozhaet li islamizatsia Kazakhstana svetskomu kharakteru gosudartsva?” *Central Asia Monitor*, 26 June, 2017, available at [\[Link\]](#), 12 June, 2019. [Back to text](#)
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